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Using the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as a natural experiment, we investigate how a major 
macroeconomic crisis affects nascent (i.e., pre-operational) ventures. Such knowledge is 
essential for a better understanding of the mechanisms behind aggregate effects of crises on the 
number and type of start-ups in an economy. Based on Hirschman's (1970) Exit-Voice Theory 
we hypothesize that a crisis would increase founders' propensity to either terminate their 
involvement with the venture (Exit) or undertake remedial action such as increased work effort 
or simplification of the venture (Voice). Further, we hypothesize that a higher degree of 
commitment to the venture (Loyalty) decreases the effect on Exit while increasing the effect of 
the crisis on Voice. We find no support for our hypothesized main effects. We find support for 
one of our moderation hypotheses: Loyalty moderates the GFC effect on venture growth 
ambition. After discussing method factors and counterbalancing effects as possible reasons for 
limited main effect support we conclude that the main reason for the relative absence of effects is 
entrepreneurial persistence - for good or bad. Our findings suggest that decreases in the number 
of start-ups—especially "high potential start-ups"—that research has shown follow from a crisis 
may be due more to potential founders (temporarily) refraining from initiating a start-up attempt 
at all, rather than to termination or redefinition of already on-going start-up efforts. Our findings 
also suggest a number of ways in which Exit-Voice Theory could be further refined. 
INTRODUCTION 
How does a sharp macroeconomic downturn affect entrepreneurial activity? A careful 
reading of the extant literature gives a fair idea of how an external shock like the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) can affect the number and composition of independent business start-ups 
in an economy. However, evidence is lacking on how the behavior of nascent entrepreneurs—
i.e., individuals who are currently actively involved in a not-yet-up-and-running start-up 
(Davidsson & Gordon, 2012; Gartner & Shaver, 2012; Reynolds, 2009)—is affected by a 
macroeconomic crisis (Saridakis, 2012). Such research is needed in order to develop a better 
understanding of how aggregate changes in the start-up activity are derived from effects on a) 
selection into the start-up process (i.e., what types of individuals attempt what types of start-ups), 
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b) selection out of that process (i.e., what types of individuals associated with what types of start-
ups give up before completing the process), and c) adaptation and redefinition of the venture in 
the light of the new realities imposed by the crisis.  
From a policy perspective it is particularly important to know whether on-going start-ups are 
terminated at a higher than normal rate and/or adapt by pursuing less innovative and growth-
oriented strategies because of the crisis. If so, policies to keep start-up efforts going may be 
justified on similar grounds as handouts to consumers to stimulate demand (Wanna, 2009) or tax 
adjustments to help small businesses survive the crises (see, e.g., Smallbone, Deakins, Battisti, & 
Kitching, 2012, regarding New Zealand GFC policies). If, on the other hand, nascent ventures 
spontaneously go essentially unscathed and unchanged through the crisis, expenditure of public 
funds to help them keep going would not be warranted.  
We use Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice Theory and two-wave panel data to investigate the 
effects of a sharp economic downturn on the behavior of nascent entrepreneurs. The onset of the 
GFC occurred during the second wave of our data collection, meaning that similar-sized sub-
samples were followed up prior to and after the onset of the GFC, respectively. This created a 
natural experiment situation, which makes it possible to distinguish genuine effects of the GFC 
from other influences over time.  
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we provide previously missing empirical 
evidence on how nascent entrepreneurs react to a major, macroeconomic crisis. This provides 
insight into how aggregate effects on the rate and composition of new venture creation come 
about, which has important implications for policy and public spending. Second, our application 
of Exit-Voice Theory in this domain tests boundary conditions of the theory and reveals several 
opportunities for refinement of it. These observations have bearing for the use and usefulness of 
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Exit-Voice Theory in other domains as well. Third, our findings provide important observations 
to inform debates on the “vulnerability” versus “resilience” views on small and early stage 
business ventures.  
Below we first provide a brief review of prior empirical research of direct relevance to our 
research question. This is followed by a section delineating our theory and hypotheses. We then 
move on to describing our methods choices and procedures, followed by reporting of our results. 
Finally, we discuss implications and alternative interpretations of our results. We close with our 
theoretical and empirical main conclusions.  
PRIOR EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS ON EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC CRISES AND 
BUSINESS START-UPS 
Financial crises can be cast as a special case of the broader phenomenon of environmental 
jolts or shocks (e.g., Haveman, 1992; Meyer, 1982; Sine & David, 2003; Venkataraman & Van 
de Ven, 1998). However, it is also a phenomenon which in its own right is more frequent than 
commonly believed (Reinhard & Rogoff, 2010). Importantly, unlike more localized shocks that 
have undeniable negative impact on specific industries, regions, and firms, macroeconomic 
crises may or may not have, or be perceived to have, relevance for and impact on the immediate 
task environment of a majority of start-up efforts. We therefore turn to two related, macro-
oriented literatures to shed some light on the likely effects of macroeconomic crisis on nascent 
ventures. One of these addresses business cycle downturns more broadly whereas the other 
focuses more narrowly on the effects of high unemployment. It should be noted that our interest 
is on the effect on start-up rates. Hence, the effects that are of immediate relevance are those 
pertaining to the propensities a) to initiate or not initiate business start-up attempts and b) to 
terminate or successfully complete them. Exits of established businesses do not directly affect 
the start-up rate.   
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At first glance both literatures give a mixed picture. A recent study of effects of the GFC 
itself suggests that business registrations fell in most countries studied, and more so in countries 
that were more severely affected (Klapper & Love, 2011). Similarly, studying effects of the 
sharp downturn in Sweden in the early 1990s, Davidsson, Lindmark and Olofsson (1999) found 
that job creation by new, independent firms fell significantly. Evidence suggests that small and 
medium sized firms experienced reduced employment during the GFC (Cowling, Liu, Ledger & 
Zhang, 2014). However, results from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys do 
not reveal a sharp or general decline in response to the GFC as regards the proportion of the adult 
population engaging in nascent ventures across a large sample of countries (Bosma & Levie, 
2010; Kelley, Bosma, & Amoros, 2011). Studying the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, 
Paulson and Townsend (2005) even found that entrepreneurial activity—measured as the 
proportion of households operating a business—increased sharply in Thailand as a result of the 
crisis.  
The literature on exits of established young/small/independent businesses tends to 
emphasize either the vulnerability or the resilience of such firms; the former deriving from 
liabilities of smallness and newness pertaining to such firms, while the latter is typically 
attributed to their alleged greater flexibility and adaptability (Pal, Torstensson, & Mattila, 2013; 
Power & Reid, 2005; Smallbone et al., 2012). The evidence lends support to both views. In line 
with the vulnerability thesis, exit rates are typically higher for young/small/independent firms. 
However, such firms appear less negatively affected by a macroeconomic crisis (Bradley, 
Aldrich, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2011; Davidsson et al., 1999). Large-scale, multi-cohort and 
longitudinal evidence from the US and Sweden shows that the survival of start-ups does not 
appear to vary markedly with the fluctuations of the business cycle (Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009; 
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ITPS, 2003). Recent research suggests that small firms affected adversely by the GFC bounce 
back quickly (Cowling et al., 2014). This is in line with the resilience thesis.  
Results from the literature focusing on unemployment and new firm formation are equally 
mixed. It appears that depending on the specific context (and method) of the study the 
relationship may come out positive, negative, or neutral (Blanchflower, 2000; Evans & Leighton, 
1989; Hamilton, 1989; Moore & Mueller, 2002; Thurik, Carree, van Stel, & Audretsch, 2008). 
The research on unemployment effects also points at a possible solution to the conundrum. High 
levels of unemployment reflect poor demand conditions as well as restricted access to external 
funding, which should depress new firm formation. At the same time higher unemployment 
means that more people have reason to find alternative ways to support themselves. In a 
generally depressed labor market this would stimulate higher numbers of business start-ups, 
especially of the income-substitution type.  
This suggests that depending on which effect is stronger the total number of start-ups or 
start-up attempts may turn in either direction as a result of a macroeconomic crisis. However, the 
type of individuals and type of businesses that make up that aggregate figure would likely 
change, with a decrease in businesses with high capitalization requirements and high growth 
potential. This is also what a closer examination of the evidence suggests. Studies finding 
negative overall effects give more weight to start-ups of “higher quality”, pursued by those with 
more working experience (Grilli, 2012). Klapper and Love (2011) include only limited liability 
companies, thus excluding large numbers of simpler businesses. Davidsson et al. (1999) focused 
on the aggregate job contributions of start-ups rather than on their raw numbers, finding the 
marked decline that is to be expected should the proportion of higher-ambition start-ups drop. 
Although they report an increase in total numbers, Paulson and Townsend (2005) also provide 
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direct evidence of the crisis leading to large numbers of simple start-ups with very low initial 
investment and thus to a qualitatively different start-up cohort than that being created before the 
crisis. Similarly, GEM data show that whereas its effect on overall start-up numbers may be 
ambiguous, the GFC was associated with a clear downturn in perceptions of opportunity while 
the proportion of necessity-based start-ups increased (Kelley, et al., 2011). Further, reductions in 
sales growth during the GFC, compared to the period prior, was more pronounced in businesses 
whose founders possessed enhanced human capital (Cowling et al., 2014). 
Thus, overall the evidence suggests that the immediate effects of a financial crisis are to 
reduce the numbers of “higher-ambition” and “higher-potential” start-ups, whereas the total 
numbers may develop in either direction. Our study can shed light on the question whether 
observed overall effects occur because potential founders refrain from initiating a start-up 
process; because they fail to complete it, or because they alter the nature of the venture in 
response to the changed circumstances.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Exit-Voice Theory 
No established theory deals specifically with how nascent entrepreneurs, i.e., founders of on-
going but not yet completed start-up attempts, react to the onset of a major economic crisis. 
Neither does the prior empirical literature address this issue. A plausible starting assumption is 
that most founders will perceive the change in conditions and that, if anything, it will be 
interpreted as a change for the worse: the nascent start-up appears less promising than it did prior 
to the onset of the crisis. We therefore view Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice Theory as a suitable 
theoretical tool for the framing of our hypotheses.  
A generic theory of human behavior in the face of decline, Exit-Voice Theory holds that 
individuals associated with an organization (e.g., employees in or customers of a business; 
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citizens of a nation) have two possible courses of action when they perceive that the organization 
is undergoing a change that decreases its benefit to the member: they can Exit (withdraw from 
the relationship) or they can Voice their discontent in the hope that this will lead to 
improvements (as explained below, Voice has broader meaning, including remedial action). By 
combining the two outcomes, Hirschman aimed to develop a more complete theory than either 
Economics or Political Science, which tend to focus singularly on Exit or Voice, respectively. 
Further, he introduced Loyalty—the individual’s degree of commitment to the organization—as 
a moderator of the effects of decline on both Exit and Voice. 
Exit-Voice Theory has been applied in many domains. Hirschman (1970) discussed the 
theory and its implications in relation to competitive business enterprises, voluntary associations, 
public service providers, trade unions, political parties, family, tribe, church, school and state 
(1970, pp. 3, 16, 76-77). Ling, Hwang, and Chen (2010) used the theory in the context of 
international relationships among nations, while Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik and Lipkus 
(1991) applied (a variant of) the theory to close personal relationships. The review by Dowding, 
John, Mergoupis and van Vugt (2000) mentions work on intergroup processes (e.g., ethnic 
groups), urban and neighborhood studies, and studies of employees’ relationships with their 
employers as major application areas. In the business domain an application close to ours is 
Dyck and Starke’s (1999) work on spin-off start-ups. We also find work on shareholder 
discontent (Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011); family business (Khavul, 
Bruton, & Wood, 2009)  and importer-exporter relationships (Payan, Obadia, Reardon, & Vida, 
2010). The work on employee relationships brings us closest to our use of the theory in the area 
of nascent entrepreneurship, which can also be viewed as dealing with self-employment 
decisions (cf. also Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004). 
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Main effect hypotheses 
Like consumers, employees or citizens, nascent entrepreneurs can choose the Exit option, 
i.e., they can terminate the venture or their involvement with it when they learn that its prospects 
are probably not as great as previously believed. Accordingly, the onset of a macroeconomic 
crisis should make founders more likely to Exit; especially those already doubting the viability of 
their venture idea (Dimov, 2010). Further, we can presume this exit response would have come 
later or not at all in the absence of a macroeconomic crisis.  
It may be noted that the expectation of Exit responses builds on the type of assumptions used 
in economics and population ecology, where inert actors are selected out if they are not apt for 
success in the prevailing environment. That is, actors are not expected to learn to adapt, but 
rather to learn that they are not suited for the task. A well-known example in a context close to 
ours is Jovanovic (1982) theory of industry selection, where firms that learn that they are 
inefficient choose to exit rather than making efforts to improve their efficiency.  
The Exit argument is also in line with the vulnerability theme discussed by Smallbone et al. 
(2012). Liabilities of smallness and newness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Freeman, Carroll, & 
Hannan, 1983) would make nascent entrepreneurs likely to give up in response to a crisis 
because of limited internal resources to mitigate the consequences of the crisis; a narrow 
(potential) customer base; reliance on a single product/service line increasing the risk of a fatal 
setback, and weak bargaining power in relations with resource providers further increasing their 
vulnerability. In line with this reasoning, Bradley et al. (2010) found that established independent 
businesses increased their exit propensity by 62 percent in response to a financial crisis, while 
Pal et al. (2013) report a doubling of bankruptcies in the textile and clothing industry during the 
GFC. If effects on nascent entrepreneurs are similar, a positive effect of macroeconomic crisis on 
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Exit should be expected. In accordance with this type of theoretical assumption and prior 
empirical findings, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The onset of a major macroeconomic crisis makes nascent entrepreneurs more likely 
to Exit, i.e., to terminate their involvement with a venture creation attempt. 
 
Founders not prone to give up may instead intensify their efforts. This leads us to 
Hirschman’s (1970) notion of Voice. This label derives from Political Science, where the 
alternative to Exit usually is expression of discontent and pleas for corrective action. However, 
Hirschman (1970: 30) defines Voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, 
an objectionable state of affairs” where this includes “various types of actions.” Accordingly, 
other researchers also include remedial action in the concept of Voice (e.g., Dowding et al., 
2000; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers & Mainous III, 1988; Vidal, 2012). Thus, if Exit is aligned with 
theoretical assumptions underlying environmental selection, Voice is Hirschman’s (1970) 
version of the strategic choice argument (Child, 1972). In the entrepreneurship literature, the 
Voice response is in line with arguments about resilience, building on notions of flexibility and 
adaptability of young/small/independent firms (Smallbone et al., 2012).  
Compared to consumers, employees or citizens, the situation is different for nascent 
entrepreneurs. Being the principal decision makers of the ventures they are trying to establish 
they do not have a micro-level counterpart to whom they can express discontent with any hope of 
remedial action resulting. On the other hand, they are not restricted to merely expressing their 
disappointment in the hope that powerful others would initiate the change they are seeking. 
Instead, equipped with more autonomy than employees (Hundley, 2001) nascent entrepreneurs 
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can take action themselves in order to compensate for the setback. Therefore, the manifestation 
of Voice that we are investigating represents what Dowding et al. (2000) call “Individual Voice” 
in the form of concrete, remedial action.  
Among nascent entrepreneurs, one likely response would be to work harder in order to 
mitigate the setback caused by the macroeconomic crisis. Those who are not giving up (as per 
our Exit hypothesis) may instead intensify their efforts in order to see their emerging venture 
make it through the hard times. Accordingly: 
 
H2a: The onset of a major macroeconomic crisis makes nascent entrepreneurs exercise 
more Voice in the form of increased efforts to bring the venture creation attempt to 
completion. 
 
Another response to try to save the emerging venture would be to change aspects of its 
business model or market strategy in order to increase its success potential in the new 
environment. Our introductory review of the empirical literature suggests such changes would 
not be random but tend in a specific direction, namely towards a simpler, less ambitious 
business. A major theme in writings on the GFC is the “credit crunch” (Cowling, Liu & Ledger, 
2012; Smallbone et al., 2012). The empirical evidence is that younger and smaller businesses 
found it more difficult to access external finance during the GFC (Cowling et al., 2012). 
However, a simpler, less ambitious business would be less in need of external finance and thus 
less affected by changes in the availability of credit. To put it the other way around, a simpler, 
less ambitious venture may be the only realistic alternative when external capital dries out. 
Further, all nascent ventures are new actors in the market and are therefore subject to liabilities 
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of newness, smallness and lack of legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Delmar & Shane, 2004). 
When novelty—innovation—is added to newness these challenges are aggravated (Amason, 
Shrader, & Tompson, 2006). In addition, it has been suggested that negative environmental 
shocks further increase the hurdles created by novelty (Shepherd, Douglas, & Shanley, 2000). 
While innovative businesses may enjoy better average performance once they are up and 
running, the evidence suggests that they are more difficult to get off the ground in the first place 
(Samuelsson & Davidsson, 2009). Therefore, in order to successfully navigate through the 
harsher conditions created by the crisis, founders have reason to modify their nascent ventures in 
a less novel direction. Accordingly, our hypotheses are:  
 
H2b & H2c: Nascent entrepreneurs who choose not to Exit in response to the onset of a 
major economic crisis are likely to exercise Voice by reducing the novelty (H2b) and 
growth ambition (H2c) of the nascent venture.  
 
Moderation by Loyalty 
 In Hirschman’s (1970) original theorizing. Loyalty refers to what may elsewhere be labeled 
commitment, and it is theorized to moderate the behavioral response to decline. In our setting, 
Loyalty to the nascent venture could be based on having invested more time and effort in it 
already; a strong emotional connection to the venture and its “cause”, and/or the dispositional 
passion or optimism (Cardon, & Kirk, 2013; Cardon et al., 2005; Dowding et al., 2000; 
Hmieleski & Baron, 2009) that is often ascribed to entrepreneurs. Thus, Loyalty may be a 
double-edged sword, potentially leading to detrimental escalation-of-commitment in situations 
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where termination is the better option (DeTienne, Shepherd, & De Castro, 2008; Holland & 
Shepherd, 2013). 
Regardless of its source, Loyalty may deter or defer Exit. For example, Hirschman (1970: 
76) mentions the difficulty of using Exit in response to disappointment with entities to which one 
has stronger bonds, such as family, tribe, church or state. In our case, Loyalty would reduce the 
propensity to terminate the venture or the founder’s involvement with it. As regards Voice, in 
Hirschman’s conception it is not expected that the more loyal endure the decline in silence. On 
the contrary, it is the more loyal—those who care more about the organization—who are more 
likely to exercise Voice, i.e., to undertake “any attempt at all to change” the “objectionable state 
of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970: 30). Hence, we suggest the following four hypotheses:  
 
H3: Loyalty negatively moderates the relationship between the onset of a major 
macroeconomic crisis and nascent entrepreneurs’ propensity to Exit. With increasing 
Loyalty, Exit is less likely to occur.  
H4: Loyalty positively moderates the relationship between the onset of a major 
macroeconomic crisis and the exercise of Voice to improve the nascent venture’s 
prospects. With increasing Loyalty, more increase in work effort (H4a) and more 
simplification of the nascent venture will occur in terms of reduced novelty (H4b) and 
growth ambition (H4c).  
 
METHOD 
The empirical setting: the GFC in Australia 
As will be detailed below we use panel data about nascent entrepreneurs in Australia. It has 
been concluded in retrospect that Australia was far less hit (longer term) by the GFC than were 
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the US and Europe (Le Queux & Waring, 2010). However, this was not at all clear at the time of 
our data collection. On the contrary, various economic indicators show that the interview period 
was indeed characterized by extreme conditions in Australia. Business confidence and related 
indicators fell very markedly to reach their lowest levels of the decade (National Australia Bank, 
2011). Further, from September 22, 2008, to March 6, 2009, the leading stock market index 
(ASX) fell by 38 percent, representing a deeper fall and slower recovery than the Dow Jones 
(Yahoo, 2014). The Australian dollar fell against the USD, EUR and GDP (from .81 to .62, close 
to 25%, against the USD) and took a full year to get back to the original level (XE Currency 
Converter, 2014). This underlines that in important respects the early GFC effects were even 
more dramatic than in these countries. 
Further, the Reserve Bank of Australia had over the preceding six years adjusted the guiding 
“cash rate” on average twice per year; always upwards, and always in increments of .25 percent. 
By contrast, from September 2008 to April 2009 there were six downward changes over eight 
months in average increments of -.75, resulting in the lowest rate on record at the time, 3.0 
percent (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014). Similarly, debt agreements, bankruptcies, and “Part 
X Administrations” peaked in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter of 2009, respectively, at levels that 
were unprecedented (the former two) or not seen for over ten years (the latter) (ITSA, 2012). 
After hovering around 315-335,000 over the preceding years, new business registrations dipped 
to under 300,000 in 2008-2009 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). After years of unbroken 
increase, house prices were on a downward slope in the late part of 2008 and well into 2009 
(Murphy, 2011), the third quarter of 2008 seeing the biggest negative adjustment in modern 
history (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Further, non-performing, securitized home loans 
(defined as being more than 90 days in arrears) also reached unprecedented levels following the 
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onset of the GFC, in value as well as in numbers (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009). National 
statistics on foreclosures (mortgage repossessions) are hard to find; a report based on court 
statistics suggests that in the state of Queensland they were 60 percent higher in 2009 than in 
2007 (LCCQ, 2010). 
All in all, there is no doubt that at the time of our post-GFC interviewing, economic actors in 
Australia were facing drastic economic downturn and very considerable uncertainty. Thus, the 
empirical setting should be suitable for testing our hypotheses.  
Sample and design 
The data used for testing our hypotheses are from the Comprehensive Australian Study of 
Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE). Adult members of 30,105 Australian households, 
selected through random digit dialing, were screened for status as nascent entrepreneurs (NE) 
using techniques that were carefully refined in prior projects (Reynolds, 2009). A total of 625 
individuals qualified as NEs and also completed a comprehensive, 40-60 minutes long telephone 
interview (W1), either directly or by later appointment. To qualify as NE they needed to be 
currently engaged as active (part) owners in an emerging business venture where some concrete 
action had been taken towards its realization (a lower limit) but where the venture did not as yet 
yield positive cash flow on a regular basis (an upper limit).  
As close as possible to 12 months after the first interview, respondents were re-contacted for 
an equally comprehensive follow-up interview (W2). The number of respondents in W2 is 493 
(78.9% of eligible cases). This is the effective sample size for our Exit analysis. Of the W2 
respondents, 337 were still actively involved in the start-up and could thus meaningfully 
participate in the full W2 survey. Thus, 337 cases is the (maximum) sample size for our tests of 
hypotheses pertaining to Voice (96% of 350 continuing nascent ventures; 13 respondents had left 
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a still active start-up team). Due to item non-response the effective sample size is slightly lower 
in displayed analyses. See Davidsson and Steffens (2011) and Davidsson, Steffens and Gordon 
(2011) for further details on CAUSEE and its sample.  
The W2 interviews took place from July 24, 2008 to June 11, 2009. The Lehman Brothers 
collapse, which is often cited as the starting point of a uniquely deep and global crisis (e.g., 
Milesi‐Ferretti & Tille, 2011; Ocampo, 2009; Rauch, Doorn, & Hulsink, 2014) occurred on 
September 15, 2008. The data referred to in the Section on The empirical setting: the GFC in 
Australia (above) confirm that it is after this event that economic indicators in Australia turned 
sharply downward to reach unprecedented levels. The fact that the W2 follow-up interview took 
place before the onset of the crisis for one large part of the sample, and after it for the remaining, 
sizeable part of it creates the natural experiment that we utilize for this research. See further our 
operationalization of “Post- vs. pre-GFC” below. 
Qualified NEs were regarded as informants on behalf of the venture start-up they were 
involved in. Consequently, where applicable, questions refer to the venture and the entire start-up 
team, and question wording was adapted accordingly.  
It is important to keep in mind that although a significant minority in a random sample are 
innovative entities with potential for growth, true high-tech and potential high-growth ventures 
set for Venture Capital backing and eventual IPOs are a tiny minority (Davidsson & Gordon, 
2012; Samuelsson & Davidsson, 2009). However, due to their sheer numbers the “modest 
majority” may have important effects on the overall economy.  
Operationalization: dependent variables  
Exit. As Hirschman’s theory is about individual responses and some ventures are founded by 
more than one individual, we measure Exit on the individual level. Specifically, Exit is a 
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dichotomous variable where (1) is recorded for cases where either the respondent or any other 
(owner) team member terminated their involvement between W1 and W2 interviews. For all 
other cases a (0) is recorded. Note that in some cases of individual level Exit the venture is 
continued by other team members. In the Difference in Difference (DID) version of our analysis 
(explained below) we use a count version of the variable: the number of team members who have 
terminated their involvement (equal to team size in the case of venture termination). The Exit 
questions were in part harmonized with the PSED II project in the US, where they originally 
appeared (Reynolds & Curtin, 2009). 
As this research uses a natural experiment situation (unplanned by definition) we are 
restricted to Voice indicators that refer to the respondent’s current and future situation; not the 
past (which may be pre-GFC for post-GFC respondents). We use the following indicators:  
Voice—Increased Work Effort. Increase in work effort is measured at the venture level as the 
W1-to-W2 increase in hours in response to the question “How many hours per week do you [and 
all other owners combined] currently work for this business?” tested against “no increase”. 
Voice—Reduced Novelty. This measure was based Dahlqvist and Wiklund’s (2012) measure, 
adapted to the nascent venture contexts and expanded to cover four forms of novelty: 1) product 
or service; 2) promotion or selling; 3) production or sourcing; and 4) target market or customers. 
Respondents who reported a lower novelty rating in W2 were asked to confirm that this was due 
to their action rather than learning that their firms was less novel than they first thought. For 
example, “According to your answers the method for promotion or selling now has a lower 
degree of newness than you reported a year ago. Is that mainly because you have changed the 
method for promotion or selling or mainly because you have found it was less different from 
what other firms do than you first thought?” Reduced Novelty is a dichotomous variable, with all 
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respondents that reported actively reducing some aspect of novelty coded (1), and those that did 
not coded (0). This measure is desirable over the raw W1-to-W2 difference in novelty rating as 
that measure would confound changes due to behavior with those due to chance or initial (W1) 
over-estimation of firm novelty. However, as dichotomous variables are not appropriate for DID 
we used the continuous variable reduction in total novelty W1-to-W2 for that analysis. 
Voice—Reduced Growth Ambition. The respondents were asked “Which of the following 
two statements best describes your preference for the future size of this business: I/we want this 
business to be as large as possible, or I/we want a size I/we can manage myself/ourselves or with 
a few key employees?” Reduced Growth Ambition is a dichotomous variable coded (1) for those 
that reduced their ambition from W1 to W2 while all others were coded (0). For the DID analysis 
we used a continuous variable based on projected numbers of employees. While this continuous 
version of this variable is arguably the more desirable measurement form, substantial internal 
non-response precludes its use in the main analyses. 
Operationalization: independent variable; moderator, controls and manipulation check 
Post- vs. pre-GFC. This is a dichotomous variable reflecting whether the W2 interview with 
the respondent was undertaken before (0) or after (1) the onset of the GFC, defined as the 
Lehman Brothers collapse on September 15, 2008. In the analysis of Exit, there are 181 pre-GFC 
and 312 post-GFC cases. In the remaining analyses, which exclude cases that have exited, the 
corresponding (maximum) numbers are 121 and 216, respectively. It should be noted that the W2 
interview was scheduled as closely as possible to 12 months after the individual respondent’s W1 
interview. Therefore, an interview later in the wave does not imply that the venture is further 
progressed in the start-up process. 
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Moderator - Loyalty. In line with the recommendation by Dowding et al. (2000) we 
operationalize Loyalty in terms of past investments. However, rather than using monetary 
investments—which vary considerably across industries and which are also empirically 
problematic due to internal non-response—we use two other indicators. The first Loyalty 
indicator is Full Time Work, reflecting whether any of the founders were regularly working 35 
hours or more per week on the venture at W1. The other Loyalty indicator is Development Stage. 
This is a count of the number of “gestation activities” (such as preparing a business plan; 
deciding on a location, raising funds; registering the firm; opening a website, etc.; see Gartner, 
Carter, & Reynolds, 2004) that were already undertaken at W1.  
Control—Gender. Two dummy variables capture gender. The first captures whether the firm 
founders are a solo male or all male team (1) compared to solo females, all women teams, or 
mixed-gender teams (0). Similarly, the second dummy captures solo females or all women teams 
(1) versus  solo males, all male teams, or mixed-gender teams (0). 
Control—Age. We control for age at using the age of the oldest founding team member. 
Control—Industry. We control for industry effects through dummy variables for each of 
seven industries that account for at least five percent of our cases, using “Other” as reference. 
Control—Novelty. Our measure of total novelty (or height of innovation) is based on the 
scale developed by Dahlqvist and Wiklund (2012; see Reduced Novelty above). The four forms 
of novelty were combined into a formative index (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001), with a 
0-12 range.  
Control - Major loan funding. We included a control for external funding because of the 
“credit crunch” aspect of the GFC. In W1 the respondents were asked, for a range of possible 
funding sources, whether the source had been used not at all; as a minor funding source, or as a 
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major funding source. The latter was defined as 20 percent or more of total funding needs. We 
computed a dichotomous variable with value (1) if one or more sources of external debt (other 
than personal credit card) were rated as major sources and value (0) for all other cases. As only 
20 percent of our cases have “Major loan funding” the majority need not be much affected by the 
“credit crunch” aspect of the GFC. 
Control—Human capital. We control for general and specific human capital at the level of 
the venture. To measure general human capital we use a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether the founding team includes someone with a University degree (1) or not (0). To measure 
specific human capital we use a dichotomous variable that captures whether anyone in the firm 
founding team had Prior start-up experience (1) or not (0). 
Control—Solo venture. Because some of our DVs are assessed on the venture level (or 
across all team members, where applicable) it is potentially important to control for whether the 
venture is started by a team or by a single individual. This control is a dummy variable with 
value (1) for solo ventures, which make up just over 50 percent of the sample. 
Table A1 (Appendix) reports the correlations among the variables in our study. 
Manipulation check—Others’ 5-year survival probability. In each wave respondents were 
asked “In this research we are talking to hundreds of early stage start-ups. If we take one hundred 
of them at random, how many do you think will still be operating five years from now, 
regardless of who own and operate them?” (cf. Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988). The W1-to-
W2 reduction in Others’ 5 year survival probability reflects an estimate of the expected severity 
of the GFC. Hence, we use this variable as a manipulation check for our natural experiment, i.e., 
to verify that there is a difference in the economic environment perceived by Post- vs. pre-GFC 




Analysis approach  
Hierarchical logistic regression (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004) was used to test our Exit 
hypothesis (H1) and Voice hypotheses relating to venture simplification (H3b, H6 and H8). Our 
other Voice variable is a count of the work hours increased; hence, negative binomial regression 
analysis was the most appropriate analysis (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Regression coefficients 
and the change in model fit were used to assess the influence of the GFC and interaction terms 
on the dependent variables. One-tailed tests of statistical significance are reported for all 
directional, hypothesized effects. This is consistent with empirical support reported as 
“significant on the X percent level” meaning there is X percent risk the result is a false positive. 
Two-tailed significance levels are reported for non-hypothesized relationships.  
In order to confirm the results for main effects of the GFC we also analyzed the magnitude 
of change in all multi-wave dependent variables using the Difference-in-Differences technique 
(Card & Krueger, 1994; Meyer, Viscusi, & Durbin, 1995). As mentioned above, for this analysis 
we used continuous versions of the dependent variables.  
Difference in differences (DID) is a quasi-experimental technique which calculates the 
average treatment effect in natural experiments such as this. It is therefore the most appropriate 
technique available for our purposes. However, it does not allow interaction effects, dichotomous 
or count variables to be modeled as dependent variables. We therefore present logistic and 
negative binomial regression results in our main body text. W1 responses produce a baseline 
measure for each DID variable, and W2 follow-up responses before and after the GFC isolate the 
within-subjects change that may be attributed to it. This technique relies on two assumptions. 
The first assumption is that assignment to the treatment group is random. In this case we infer 
 21 
 
that random sampling at initial recruitment results in random assignment to the treatment group. 
The second assumption is that there is a common trend within experimental groups. Here we rely 
on a common between-wave interval of approximately one year for all subjects, and that the 
initial interview occurred well before the onset of the GFC. An initial DID analysis focused on 
the dependent variables in isolation, and linear regression estimated the total explained variance. 
A second DID analysis included control variables as covariates in the differences estimation. 
We expect that should our results reflect the true nature of the underlying main effect of the 
GFC on nascent venturing then the two types of analysis employed would agree. The use of two 
analysis approaches where the results concur ensures confidence that the results obtained were 
not due to a method effect which may have accidentally capitalized on the distributional 
properties of the dependent variables. 
A large number of robustness tests and auxiliary analyses were conducted in order to help 
the interpretation of the observed results. A summary of these analyses will be given in a 
separate sub-section towards the end of the Results section.  
Our setting as an arena for testing Exit-Voice Theory 
Although different from the settings that were Hirschman’s immediate inspiration for 
developing Exit-Voice Theory it is worth noting that our context has certain compelling features 
as an arena for testing it, and that our study compares well to prior research in terms of some of 
the problems Dowding et al. (2000) identified in their review. They call for longitudinal and 
experimental studies (p. 491); we have a natural experiment with pre- and post-measurement, 
making the context suitable for causal inference. Dowding et al. (2000: 473-5) point to 
circumstances where Exit and Voice are simultaneous; Exit follows Voice, and Voice follows 
Exit (see also Dyck & Starke, 1999; McClean et al., 2013). This does not complicate our study, 
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because the types of Voice that we investigate can only be reported by founders who choose not 
to Exit within the study’s time frame. 
Dowding et al. (2000: 472, 491) raise the issue of the theory’s ambiguity concerning 
individual vs. collective Voice or Exit. Our study is essentially about what they would classify as 
the individual versions of these constructs. In addition, our use of a nascent entrepreneur context 
gears our operationalizations of Voice towards a focused set of rather tangible behaviors 
representing increased effort and strategic change. Further, Dowding et al. (2000) repeatedly 
lament the use of Loyalty as a separate behavioral response. We use it as Hirschman (1970) 
intended it to be used, namely as a moderator of Exit and Voice responses. Dowding et al. (2000) 
also point out that Hirschman fails to account for the possibility that the (affected) entity one is 
loyal to may be different from the entity responsible for its decline. We operationalize Loyalty in 
the manner Dowding et al. (pp. 477; 491) recommend and our Loyalty indicators clearly refer to 
the object of attachment rather than the source responsible for the decline. For these reasons, we 
hold that our study provides a suitable arena for testing Hirschman’s (1970) theory in a domain 
where it is reasonable to expect its  predictions to apply.  
 
RESULTS 
Results of hypothesis tests 
Table 1 reports the logistic regression results for our Exit analysis. The corresponding DID 
test is found in Table A2 (Appendix). Four models are presented. Model 1 includes controls and 
non-hypothesized main effects of moderators. In Models 2-4 we introduce first the GFC main 
effect and then each of the two Loyalty moderator analyses separately. This is also the set of 
models we will report in all subsequent, main body text analyses. 
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Model 2 reveals a negative effect of the GFC on Exit. This is the opposite of H1; rather than 
increasing the propensity to Exit, the onset of the GFC appears to have reduced it. Evaluated as a 
non-directional test the effect would be marginally statistically significant at conventional levels 
of risk (p = 0.081; two-tailed). At 0.8 percent the increase in Nagelkerke’s R2 is small but not 
completely negligible. However, this non-hypothesized result should not be over interpreted. It 
does not hold up in the DID analysis and it is weaker in each of our robustness tests than it is in 
Table 1. Hence, it is best regarded a non-effect. Hypothesis 1 is rejected; we do not find evidence 
that a crisis of the magnitude represented by the GFC in Australia increases the incidence of Exit 
among nascent entrepreneurs. 
====================== 
Insert Table 1 about here! 
====================== 
Model 1 reports significant and negative main effects for both measures of Loyalty, 
suggesting that Loyalty reduces Exit. This serves to increase our confidence in the validity of 
these indicators of Loyalty. However, our Loyalty hypothesis (H3) concerns not this main effect, 
but interaction between GFC and Loyalty. The analyses (Models 3 and 4) show that both 
interaction terms (GFC x Full time work and GFC x Development stage) are negative as 
predicted. In the latter case, the effect is statistically significant (p=0.007) and the increase in 
pseudo-R2 estimates is non-trivial; 1-1.5 percent. Although in this analysis the estimated main 
effect of the GFC turns positive and significant (p=0.048) in Model 4, this cannot be interpreted 
as support for a direct, positive effect on Exit. Instead, the joint effect of the original variable and 
the interaction term needs to be evaluated. The interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 1 (top). 
The GFC significantly increases the negative effect of venture development stage on Exit. Figure 
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1 (bottom) also shows the 95 percent confidence band for the marginal probability of Exit at 
different stages of development, conditioned upon the effect of the GFC. The fact that the graph 
passes through zero suggests that low development ventures are more likely to exit because of 
the GFC (positive marginal effect), whereas high development ventures are less likely to exit 
because of the GFC (negative marginal effect). This relationship is statistically significant in 
areas where the 95 percent confidence band does not include zero. In approximate terms, this 
means that ventures which have gone past the midway mark for what it normally requires to 
become an operational business are up to 20 percent less likely to Exit because of the GFC. In 
all, we get partial support for Hypothesis 3; Exit in response to macroeconomic crisis appears 
somewhat less likely among founders with a higher degree of Loyalty to their venture.  
====================== 
Insert Figure 1 about here! 
====================== 
As regards control variables it may be noted that older age is negatively related to Exit while 
experienced entrepreneurs appear somewhat more prone to Exit than are novices. We find only 
weak/uncertain industry effects.  
Table 2 displays the results for our first Voice regression. Voice is here represented by 
increased work effort (H2a). Thus, the dependent variable is increase in work effort (hours) 





Insert Table 2 about here! 
====================== 
Model 6 shows that the estimated effect of the GFC is negative, contrary to expectation. 
However, evaluated as a non-directional hypothesis the effect is far from statistically significant 
(p=0.601; two-tailed) and the inclusion of the variable does nothing to increase R2. The 
corresponding DID analysis (Table A2) for change in work effort shows neither a significant 
increase (Voice) nor decrease. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is not supported.  
The moderation effects of Loyalty (H4a; Models 7 and 8) are both in the predicted direction. 
The moderation effect of Full time work is marginally significant (p=0.070) and increases R2 
slightly. However, moderation by Development stage is far from being statistically significant or 
contributing meaningfully to R2. Thus, hypothesis 4a gets only weak and partial support. 
Table 3 displays the results for our remaining Voice indicators, pertaining to reductions of 
the Novelty (H2b) and Growth ambition (H2c) of the nascent venture. Both of these indicators 
are dichotomous, hence logistic regression was applied. Model 9 shows control variable effects 
suggesting that those initially reporting higher novelty and greater dependence on loan funding, 
and those working full time on the start-up, report more reductions in novelty. This may relate to 
problems with market- or technological feasibility of the original concept, and realizing this by 
working more intensely with its realization. Founder age and education also seems to affect the 




Insert Table 3 about here! 
====================== 
Model 10 reports the result for the onset of the GFC. The estimated effect is statistically 
non-significant and not even in the hypothesized direction. Thus, this analysis lends no support 
for Hypothesis 2b. Further, both moderation effect estimates (independent tests of H4b; Models 
11 and 12) are negative, counter to the hypothesis. In the case of GFC x Full time work the 
unexpected negative effect is significant, if evaluated as a non-directional test (p=0.048; two-
tailed). Consequently, this hypothesis does not get any support in the Novelty reduction analysis.   
The results lend some support for our theorized reduction of Growth ambition. These results 
are reported in Models 13-16. To start with the non-hypothesized relationships, in Model 13 we 
find significant main effects for one of the Loyalty indicators; Full time work (p=0.048). One 
gender control (all male venture) appears to be associated with higher likelihood of reducing 
Growth ambition (p=0.051). This is likely due to low prevalence of Growth ambitions in the first 
place in the comparison group, which is mixed gender (usually spousal or de facto) teams.  
Model 14 demonstrates that the estimated effect of the GFC is practically zero. This means 
that none of the tests of Voice main effects (increased work effort; reduced novelty; reduced 
growth ambition) supports Hypothesis 2 (a, b or c). We do not find evidence that nascent 
entrepreneurs who choose not to Exit instead exercise Voice, e.g., take remedial action, to 
increase the nascent venture’s chances in the changed environment. However, with respect to 
Growth ambition we do find support for moderation by Loyalty. Models 15 and 16 show that 
both of the Loyalty moderators, GFC x Full time work (p=0.011) and GFC x Development stage 
(p=0.049), have positive effects (as expected) that are statistically significant. In terms of 
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contribution to R2 the estimated effects are in the .7 to 2.8 percent range, where the latter must be 
regarded a substantial increase. Over all, we find support for Hypothesis 4c. Loyalty has a 
tendency to moderate nascent entrepreneurs’ response to macroeconomic crisis in terms of 
adjusting downward their ambitions for growth, and increasing their work effort. The theorized 
reason for this is that this increases the probability of getting the venture up and running at all 
under the new and harsher environmental conditions.   
Robustness tests and auxiliary analyses 
Extensive robustness tests and auxiliary analyses were performed to support the reliability 
and interpretation of the results reported1. First, analyses revealed no selection effects among 
important variables for W2 non-respondents. Second, there were no differences in control 
variables between experimental groups, save for those in the pre-GFC group being somewhat 
older than those post-GFC. This suggests our findings are not the product of selection or 
assignment bias. 
Further, we undertook the following tests to check the robustness of our GFC effects: 1) 
setting the GFC onset at one month after Lehman Brothers collapse to account for delayed 
reaction; 2) using the number of ‘months in GFC’ as continuous indicator (original and squared) 
to account for gradual and curvilinear effects of time in crisis; 3) running the analyses separately 
for solo founders to account for level of analysis effects; 4) running analyses separately for 
manufacturing and constructions firms, and then other firms excluding these two industries, to 
account for those industries likely to be hardest hit by the GFC; 5) using venture Exit rather than 
individual Exit, applying a completely different analysis approach using data from all four waves 
of data collection and time-stamped information about when the exit occurred and not relying on 
a specific date as the “onset of the GFC”, and 6) considering the potential process nature of 
                                                            
1 Detailed results available from the authors on request. 
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behavioral responses by viewing neglect (Rusbult, 1988) as a possible precursor of Exit, testing 
reduced work effort as an alternate outcome. In addition, we considered moderation effects of 
Novelty in alternate regression models to check whether GFC effects on Exit and Voice were 
contingent on the high potential nature of the venture. We also undertook analyses using 
“reaching operational state” (extended period of positive cash flow) as the dependent variable. 
This is an important supplement for conclusions about nascent ventures’ contribution to observed 
decline in new business registrations. 
The only robustness analysis yielding a statistically significant result was the “months in 
GFC” analysis suggesting slightly increasing neglect as reduced work effort (p=0.092; two 
tailed) over time. Overall, these analyses do not give reason to alter our main conclusion about 
limited main effects of the GFC, lending increased validity to our reported main findings. 
For those nascent entrepreneurs that exited, data collected on their reasons for terminating 
the venture reveals some useful information relating to the GFC. Those that report Exit after the 
GFC suggest that “high profitability looked less likely than previously thought” marginally more 
than those who exited pre-GFC. The notion that the crisis may restrict alternate opportunities 
gains some support as those that exit post GFC are less likely to suggest they found “another job 
or business that looked more promising”. 
Some further light is shed by responses to a set of GFC-tailored questions that were asked to 
all contacted cases in W3, approximately one year after the event. In response to the question 
“How much did the global financial crisis, which became noticeable in 2008, affect your 
business in comparison to your expectations for the business during the past year?” over half (57 
percent) suggested ‘not at all’ compared to 18 percent who said ‘a lot’. Accordingly, relatively 
few reported making any changes to their business or future plans as a result of the global 
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financial crisis (20 percent). The most challenging effect felt by the minority who reported being 
impacted was ‘slow or lost sales’ (58 percent of eligible cases) followed by the ‘unpredictability 
of business conditions’ (16 percent). It should be noted that these relatively modest levels are 
reported despite the full force of hindsight bias and attributional processes that can be expected 
when individuals are prompted with a specific, possible cause when asked to make sense of 
events in arrears (Shaver, 2010). By contrast, our main findings stem from unobtrusive 
comparison of behaviors reported before and after the onset of the GFC, without any reference to 
that event.   
Summary 
Table 4 summarizes the results of our Hypothesis tests. The briefest possible commentary of 
the results is that there is a startling absence of statistically meaningful support for our main 
effect hypotheses. The onset of a macroeconomic crisis does not appear to markedly affect how 
nascent entrepreneurs act with regard to their emerging ventures.  
====================== 
Insert Table 4 about here! 
====================== 
We do find some support that Loyalty reduces Exit and increases Voice, i.e., that in response 
to a crisis, entrepreneurs who have invested more and reached further in the venture creation 
process are less likely to abandon the start-up in response to the crisis and instead more likely to 
try to save it through remedial action. Further, those working full time on their venture, or have 
developed their venture further are more likely to simplify it by adjusting downward their 
preference for growth in response to a crisis. Some of these effects are substantial, adding up to 
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2.8 percent explained variance. However, the overall the support for Loyalty moderation cannot 
be described as particularly strong. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Main results  
Our results afford some support to the notion that Loyalty affects the relative likelihood of 
Exit and Voice responses among nascent entrepreneurs facing a macroeconomic crisis. This 
lends some support to the applicability for Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice Theory in this 
domain. However, by far the most consistent pattern found in our study is that our hypothesized 
main effects regarding Exit and Voice were clearly not supported by the data, despite the 
appropriate research setting. In our view, this surprise finding is what makes our study 
interesting (Davis, 1971) and potentially important. This result suggests that for most nascent 
entrepreneurs and their on-going start-up efforts the (behavioral) effects of macroeconomic 
crises are far smaller than what is likely to be commonly believed. For Exit this may be due to 
the fact that a macroeconomic crisis worsens the prospects also of the other alternatives 
(employment; other ventures; retirement based on now reduced wealth) available to and/or 
considered by the individual. A slight change in reported Exit reasons (auxiliary analysis) is 
aligned with this interpretation. However, decline in other alternatives cannot account for the 
apparent low incidence of remedial action, i.e., Voice. Prompted self-reports of GFC effects 
(auxiliary analysis) also point at limited effects, especially as these self-reports are likely to be 
exaggerated.  
If correct, the finding that the effects on nascent entrepreneurs are very limited is important 
for three major reasons: 1) correct understanding of the phenomenon and the policy implications 
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that come with such understanding; 2) insights into possible refinements of Exit-Voice Theory 
and its applicability to nascent entrepreneurship, and 3) insights into how observed resilience of 
emerging/young/small/independent firms should be interpreted. Below, we will discuss each in 
turn. 
Understanding of the phenomenon and its implications for policy  
The lack of support of our main effect hypotheses suggests that the noticeable reduction in 
business registrations reported by Klapper and Love (2011) arises mainly from processes other 
than killing off independent start-ups in the making. Over the same time period as our study, 
registrations in Australia fell by 8 percent (in 2008-9) compared to the preceding years. If 
termination of ongoing, independent start-up efforts had its fair share of that decrease, the result 
found in our sample would be extremely unlikely from a statistical point of view. A robustness 
test found no effect on the propensity to get up and running and our main finding suggested—if 
anything—a negative effect of the GFC on Exit.  
Therefore, the observed decline in registrations is likely due to other mechanisms. One 
candidate is decrease in the formation of new organizational entities by existing firms. This is 
supported by results suggesting that larger firms are relatively harder hit by crises (Bradley et al., 
2011; Davidsson et al., 1999). As regards independent start-ups the effect of a crisis may 
predominantly be to make prospective entrepreneurs refrain from entering the process, rather 
than forcing them to exit or to alter their venture idea once they are underway. Known effects of 
macroeconomic crises on the rate and composition of start-ups suggests the former—refraining 
from entering a start-up process—may be particularly true for those capable of founding “high 
potential” ventures (see Section on Prior empirical insights on effects of macroeconomic crises, 
above). Other research suggests this effect may represent a delay of the entry point rather than 
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permanently barring prospective entrepreneurs from trying that career (Yu, Orazem, & Jolly, 
2009). Similarly, business registrations in Australia not only recovered but surpassed previously 
recorded levels after the GFC (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011).  
The lack of effect on Exit and Voice has important implications for policy and public 
spending. In a time when business start-ups are high on the policy agenda (Shane, 2009) and on-
going start-up efforts are increasingly accessible through business incubators and start-up 
support programs (Thompson, Scott, & Downing, 2012), it is conceivable that policies would be 
designed to keep start-up efforts alive (without reduced ambition or innovativeness). Our 
results—which arguably represent the only, systematic evidence on the issue—suggests public 
spending of that kind would not be justified.  
Insights into possible refinements of Exit-Voice Theory and its applicability  
Hirschman’s (1970) theorizing seems to implicitly assume relative decline of the focal 
organization. By contrast, our context is one of more or less general decline. When alternatives 
to the current start-up are also negatively affected, the propensity to respond by Exit should 
perhaps not be expected to be very strong. Thus, the theory would benefit from absorbing the 
distinction between absolute and relative decline.  
However, this distinction has little bearing on Voice. Hirschman’s theorizing suggests we 
should expect more Voice to result when the Exit option is more or less barred (see, e.g., 
Hirschman, 1970: 79-81). In contrast, our study found weak or no effects on Voice. In part this 
may be due to the empirical problem of capturing enough of the relevant manifestations of 
Voice; in comparison to Exit it is a more multi-faceted and therefore more empirically elusive 
response. But there is also an underlying, theoretical problem. Hirschman (1970) seems to 
implicitly assume that all actors, or at least a sufficient proportion of them, will do something in 
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response to dissatisfaction with decline (cf. Burris, Detert, & Chiaburu, 2008: 913). Our results 
suggest this is not the case with nascent entrepreneurs; the vast majority seems to react very little 
to the crisis. Dowding et al.’s (2000) observation of generally weak Voice effects suggest this 
may be the case in many other domains, including some of those Hirschman originally had in 
mind for his theory. The theory may thus benefit from the inclusion of a non-action alternative 
that reflects a considered decision to “sit it out”.  
 It may be argued that Rusbuilt’s (1988) re-interpretation of Exit-Voice does that by 
associating Loyalty with non-action. However, simply interpreting non-action as Loyalty is very 
unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view. Presumably, non-action may just as well 
represent any of the (partly overlapping) alternatives “ignorance”, “denial”, “paralysis”, 
“indecision”, “vacillation” or “patient suffering”. Therefore, the addition of (a) considered “non-
action” alternative(s) to the theory’s repertoire of responses seems to require deeper theoretical 
(and empirical) assessment of the “content” of non-action. In this context, the notion of “threat 
rigidity” (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) may prove useful. Although the threat rigidity 
thesis is most commonly applied to (large) organizations (e.g., Barnett & Pratt, 2000; Shimizu, 
2007) it was originally conceived as a multi-level phenomenon, and the individual-level 
mechanisms were outlined already by the originators (Staw et al., 1981). This shows promise for 
application to a phenomenon such as nascent entrepreneurship. The challenge of predicting and 
testing a non-response main effect would remain, but journeys into the qualities of the non-
response as well as the search for theoretical moderators of the extent of measurable response 
may benefit from the threat rigidity literature.   
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Insights into the interpretation of observed vulnerability and resilience  
Persistence (Hoang & Gimeno, 2010), resilience (Bullough, Renko, & Myatt, 2014) and 
tenacity (Baum & Locke, 2004) are labels used for a positive quality often ascribed to (nascent) 
entrepreneurs and their emerging/new/small/independent ventures. Often this quality is taken as 
an explanation why they can survive and flourish despite undeniable vulnerability due to 
obstacles like lacking legitimacy and liabilities of newness and smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Delmar & Shane, 2004; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983). 
Empirical results showing relatively smaller adverse effects of crises, compared to large 
firms, can be taken as support for the resilience thesis (Bradley et al., 2011; Davidsson et al., 
1999). Importantly, the resilience is commonly associated with greater flexibility and 
adaptability of younger and smaller actors. Along those lines, other research has highlighted how 
business founders can get by under tough circumstances through smart, frugal and highly 
adaptive strategies and tactics (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy; 2008).  
It is therefore imperative to note that adaptability and flexibility do not appear to be the main 
thrust of what we observe in our study. We find no direct evidence that it was creative 
maneuvering that kept the nascent entrepreneurs in our sample going through the crisis. Rather, 
our findings suggest that in most cases their particular start-up effort was not much affected by 
the macroeconomic crisis and that they therefore went on with (emerging) “business as usual” 
right through it. It is conceivable that the challenge of a macroeconomic crisis is manageable for 
nascent entrepreneurs because many start-ups efforts are locally anchored and only indirectly 
affected by global- and national level developments (Julien, 2007). Indeed, in the nascent stage 
they are not yet fully integrated in the economy at all.  
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A more negative interpretation of persistence (DeTienne et al., 2008) suggests the absence 
of main effects may be due to a combination of denial and the fact that other alternatives open to 
the nascent entrepreneurs were also adversely affected by the crisis. This would leave founders 
“locked in” to no longer so promising-looking venturing attempts. The increase in necessity-
based entrepreneurial activity reported from the GEM project (Bosma & Levie, 2010; Kelley, et 
al., 2011) is in line with this theme. Thus, an alternative interpretation is that many nascent 
entrepreneurs are adversely affected but choose to simply “sit it out”. However, this does not 
explain the absence of effects on Voice. Lack of other alternatives should not prevent founders 
from actively improving their situation. Further, not even when prompted in arrears did a 
majority of nascent entrepreneurs report adverse effects of the GFC.  
In all, although there are many examples of impressive ingenuity and flexible adaptation in 
venture creation processes, one should not assume that this must generally be the reason why 
they make it through a crisis seemingly unscathed. The prevalent absence of response to 
macroeconomic crisis does not necessarily mean the nascent ventures are not vulnerable, and 
their ability to avoid termination does not necessarily reflect the creative form of resilience.  
Alternative interpretations of our main results  
The seemingly limited effects of the GFC on our sample of nascent entrepreneurs were not 
theoretically expected. In addition, they seem to run counter to what one would infer from effects 
on start-up rates and the exit of established small firms (Bradley et al., 2011; Klapper & Love, 
2011). This calls for a thorough discussion of alternative explanations of the observed, empirical 
patterns. Apart from our main interpretation—that effects truly were very limited—we see two 
possible reasons for the relative lack of support for our main effect hypotheses: 1) 
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methodological limitations and 2) counterbalancing effects. Below we elaborate on each of these 
alternatives. 
Methodological limitations. There are three primary candidates for the weak relationships 
being driven by method factors: a) measurement error in the dependent variables; b) 
measurement error in the independent or moderator (explanatory) variables, and c) insufficient 
statistical power (Cohen, 1988). Two validity issues relate to our Exit variable: a) does it truly 
represent Exit, and, if so, b) does it represent Exit in response to the GFC? Poor validity in the 
first sense is unlikely due to its factual nature, and the significant main effects of our Loyalty 
indicators on Exit support the validity of the measures. The issue of exit time is a far more 
pertinent issue. Not only is it possible that exits reported post-GFC actually pre-dated the 
Lehman Brothers collapse; it is also possible that exits triggered by the downturn occur with 
such long lag that they are not captured within the interview period. However, we did not find 
strong evidence of neglect as precursor of Exit (from robustness tests). Further, and more 
importantly, a range of robustness tests including one using time-stamped venture exit data also 
failed to find any association between the GFC and Exit. This makes us confident that 
measurement error does not explain our lack of direct effect of the GFC on Exit.  
In addition to their significant direct effects on Exit our Loyalty indicators get further 
backing through partial support for moderation by Loyalty. With regard to Voice measured as 
change in work effort, this is again information of a factual nature, unlikely to be prone to large 
or systematic measurement error. All three Voice variables reflect rather straightforward 
behavioral facts and intentions rather than, e.g., complex psychological constructs that are 
particularly hard to measure. Reductions of novelty were confirmed through direct questions 
following unobtrusive assessment of reported decrease in novelty. Growth ambition was 
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captured in a way that has been used extensively in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
as well as the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) and its counterpart studies 
(Bosma & Levie, 2009; Davidsson & Gordon, 2012). Although the dichotomous nature of these 
indicators is a limitation, the continuous alternatives used in the DID analysis (Appendix) did not 
yield more support for the hypothesized relationships. In addition, weak effect on Voice is 
something our study shares with many others (Dowding et al., 2000). For the above reasons, we 
do not believe measurement problems pertaining to the dependent variables to be a main driver 
of our estimated non-effects of the onset of the GFC. 
Measurement of the independent variable in our case coincides with the strength of the 
experimental manipulation. The onset of the GFC in Australia was no doubt a relatively sudden 
and dramatic event in comparison to normal business cycle swings (see Section on The empirical 
setting: the GFC in Australia, above). Hence, should the non-support for our main support 
hypotheses somehow be context-specific (cf. Welter, 2011) it is not because the downturn was 
less dramatic then elsewhere during our measurement period. Further, although it is unrealistic to 
assume that the effects would set in to the full from one day to the next, several robustness tests 
allowing other patterns over time also fail to support for our main effect hypotheses.  
A possibly more important concern is that close examination of the development of the 
indicators (cf. Section on The empirical setting: the GFC in Australia, above) suggests that the 
economy had already started to turn down—albeit much more mildly—in the months preceding 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Further, although the indicators stayed at low levels in absolute 
terms they started to turn up again during our “GFC interview period”. Thus, to the extent that 
turning points and current trend direction are as or even more important than absolute levels, this 
means that the difference between what our pre- and post-GFC respondents perceived in their 
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environment was not as clearly “better” and “worse” as what would have been ideal for testing 
our hypotheses. If our “pre-GFC” cases were as affected by economic downturn as our “post-
GFC” cases, then one would expect the former group’s estimated 5-year survival chances for 
other start-ups to go down from W1 to W2, and to do so just as much as this estimate is 
downward adjusted among “post-GFC” cases. Our manipulation check shows this is not the case. 
The “pre-GFC” group does not adjust their estimate downwards while the post-GFC cases do so, 
if only to a moderate extent. The difference between the groups is statistically significant (see 
last row in our DID analysis, Appendix Table A2). This result is exactly in line with only “post-
GFC” cases being affected by the macroeconomic crisis at the time of the W2 interview, and that 
while they noticed the environmental change they did not see it as a major hurdle for business 
start-ups.  
As regards statistical power the critical parameters are effect size and sample size. Our 
sample size—314 to 493 cases depending on which analysis—is neither particularly small nor 
particularly large in comparison to other survey research. The question is whether it is sufficient 
to secure statistical significance for true effects of a magnitude that is realistic to expect under 
the circumstances? Looking at evidence like that presented by Klapper and Love (2011) or the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) the effects of the GFC on registrations appear clear 
enough in the aggregate. However, an alternative way of reading the aggregate figures is that 75-
95 percent of the business population was largely unaffected by the crisis. If that is the case it 
may be unrealistic to believe that all true and important aggregate effects would be captured in a 
sample the size of ours.  
As a case in point, if the interaction effect in Figure 1 is true it suggests a difference in Exit 
probability of up to approximately 20 percentage points for firms with over 10 gestation 
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activities completed. There may be many practically significant (Kirk, 1996) GFC effects that 
are smaller than this, which do not reach statistical significance in a sample the size of ours. 
However, this explanation for weak support for our hypotheses carries little weight in those 
(frequent) cases where the estimated effect is not even in the expected direction. In all, although 
method factors may undoubtedly have played a role in our main effect hypotheses being largely 
unsupported, we find it highly unlikely that true effects of a meaningful magnitude occurred in 
the real economy and that shortcomings of our methods are solely responsible for our main effect 
hypotheses being rejected.  
Counterbalancing effects. We already considered counterbalancing effects in our use of 
Exit-Voice Theory as well as by including decreased work effort as indicator of neglect in our 
robustness tests and increased work effort as an indicator of Voice. As regards Voice one can 
perhaps not exclude the possibility that some committed founders think they need to aim higher 
when the going gets tougher, although there is no evidence that this would increase their chances 
of taking their venture to an operational stage. If such a tendency were more pronounced among 
highly committed founders it would also dilute results pertaining to Loyalty moderation. Thus, 
counterbalancing effects may also have contributed to limited support for our moderation 
hypotheses.  
All in all, counterbalancing effects seem to be a possible part of the explanation for not 
obtaining the expected effect for some of our hypotheses. However, in our view the suggested 
counterbalancing effects do not seem to hold up as a convincing general explanation for limited 
support for the predicted main effects of the crisis.  
Summing up, in the light of our results—including all robustness tests and auxiliary 
analysis—we feel confident that our findings give a fair image of the actual response of nascent 
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entrepreneurs to macroeconomic crisis, namely that for the most part they do not do much at all 
in response to it. This may be seen as admirable persistence, but does not in the main seem to 
reflect the flexibility and adaptability commonly attributed to business founders and their 
emerging ventures.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we used the onset of the GFC in the middle of an on-going, longitudinal study 
as a natural experiment in order to investigate the effects of a major economic downturn on the 
development of nascent ventures. Drawing on Exit-Voice Theory, we hypothesized increased 
propensity to Exit or—alternatively—increase in work effort and other means of remedial action 
(Voice), expecting both responses to be moderated by Loyalty. 
Overall, we found very limited support for our main effect hypotheses. Prior research 
suggests crises lead to a reduction in start-up numbers, or at least to changes in the composition 
of the start-up population. Our results suggest that the mechanism behind this is not primarily 
termination or change of on-going start-up efforts. Rather, to the extent that independent start-
ups account for part of the observed reductions in new business registration the mechanism is 
likely to be that potential founders (temporarily) refrain from initiating a start-up attempt at all.  
We have thoroughly discussed the possible reasons why nascent entrepreneurs appear not to 
terminate or modify their venture in response to a macroeconomic crises. Although method 
factors and counterbalancing forces may have played a role in concealing or diluting the effects, 
our interpretation is that the results reflect that the large majority of nascent ventures really are 
not strongly affected (behaviorally) by a macroeconomic crisis. Presumably, they are much more 
affected by a relatively narrow, immediate task environment than directly by the fluctuations of 
the macro-economy.  
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As emerging firms and their founders were not one of the original domains claimed for Exit-
Voice Theory, the limited effects of the GFC recorded in our study should not be regarded as 
evidence against its validity in other domains. This said, our findings and interpretations gave 
reason to suggest refinement of the theory, which may give it more predictive power both with 
respect to nascent entrepreneurship and within other domains of human behavior.  
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Table 1: Logistic regression analyses of the effect of the GFC on Exit. 
Independent variables Exit Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 1.760** 2.128** 2.113** 1.343† 
All male venture 0.282 0.293 0.294 0.273 
All female venture 0.181 0.204 0.205 0.151 
Age oldest owner -0.020* -0.022* -0.022* -0.022* 
Retail 0.044 0.008 0.015 0.008 
Consumer services -0.215 -0.248 -0.247 -0.248 
Health and social services -0.457 -0.495 -0.502 -0.505 
Manufacturing -0.285 -0.263 -0.259 -0.221 
Construction -0.356 -0.353 -0.344 -0.336 
Agriculture -0.698 -0.69 -0.693 -0.776 
Business consulting -0.044 -0.108 -0.106 -0.163 
Novelty 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.002 
Major loan funding 0.138 0.144 0.131 0.143 
University degree 0.15 0.143 0.143 0.157 
Prior start-ups 0.471* 0.455† 0.451† 0.445† 
Solo venture -0.521 -0.563† -0.568† -0.529 
Loyalty - Full time work -0.581* -0.555* -0.419 -0.589* 
Loyalty - Initial dev. stage -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.036 
Post- vs. pre-GFC   -0.376 -0.319 1.001* 
    (0.216) (0.251) (0.600) 
GFC x Full time work     -0.212   
      (0.476)   
GFC x Development       -0.083** 
        (0.034) 
n 493       
Model Χ2 63.360*** 66.399*** 66.596*** 72.452*** 
Log likelihood -282.582 -281.062 -280.963 -278.036 
Cox & Snell R2 0.121 0.126 0.126 0.137 
Nagelkerke R2 0.167 0.175 0.175 0.190 
ModelΔ Χ2   3.039† 0.197 6.053* 
Note: Logistic regression parameters expressed as unstandardized coefficients, with standard error for variables with 
hypothesized influence in parentheses; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; one-tailed statistical 
significance for hypothesized directional effects and two-tailed otherwise.  
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Table 2: Negative binomial regression analyses of the effect of the GFC on Voice as increased work 
effort. 
Independent variables Voice - Increased work effort 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 2.249* 2.418* 2.611* 2.600* 
All male venture -0.413 -0.496 -0.451 -0.481 
All female venture -0.418 -0.419 -0.246 -0.392 
Age oldest owner 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 
Retail -0.156 -0.244 -0.382 -0.249 
Consumer services 0.000 -0.045 -0.133 -0.077 
Health and social services 0.356 0.274 0.264 0.26 
Manufacturing -1.271† -1.299* -1.402* -1.333* 
Construction -1.391 -1.482† -1.345 -1.421 
Agriculture -0.713 -0.803 -0.698 -0.812 
Business consulting -0.114 -0.208 -0.326 -0.212 
Novelty -0.088 -0.084 -0.084 -0.078 
Major loan funding 0.214 0.249 0.234 0.256 
University degree -0.176 -0.148 -0.239 -0.16 
Prior start-ups 0.375 0.316 0.248 0.326 
Solo venture -0.627 -0.634 -0.684 -0.623 
Loyalty - Full time work -0.328 -0.323 -1.004 -0.317 
Loyalty - Initial dev. stage 0.009 0.012 0.016 -0.002 
Post- vs. pre-GFC   -0.199 -0.608 -0.565 
    (0.380) (0.485) (1.178) 
GFC x Full time work    1.004†  
     (0.739)  
GFC x Development     0.020 
      (0.059) 
n 330    
Model Χ2 20.874 21.151 22.934 21.259 
Log likelihood -776.611 -776.473 -775.581 -776.418 
Cox & Snell R2 0.061 0.062 0.067 0.062 
Nagelkerke R2 0.062 0.063 0.068 0.063 
ModelΔ Χ2  0.277 1.783 0.108 
Note: Negative binomial regression parameters expressed as unstandardized coefficients, with standard error for 
variables with hypothesized influence in parentheses; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; one-tailed 
statistical significance for hypothesized directional effects and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 3: Logistic regression analyses of the effect of the GFC on Voice as venture simplification. 
Independent variables Voice - Reduced novelty Voice - Reduced growth Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Constant -1.666† -1.327 -1.871† -1.57 -1.556 -1.592 -1.223 -0.606 
All male venture 0.331 0.313 0.312 0.305 0.937† 0.936† 0.940† 0.934† 
All female venture 0.47 0.466 0.495 0.458 0.988 0.985 1.027† 1.006 
Age oldest owner -0.029† -0.031* -0.034* -0.031* -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 
Retail 0.047 0.029 0.128 0.029 -0.461 -0.458 -0.558 -0.442 
Consumer services 0.416 0.395 0.42 0.39 -0.128 -0.123 -0.161 -0.109 
Health and social services 0.59 0.561 0.552 0.577 0.409 0.415 0.436 0.373 
Manufacturing 0.439 0.501 0.636 0.508 -0.247 -0.252 -0.34 -0.275 
Construction -0.092 -0.068 -0.022 -0.08 0.453 0.451 0.426 0.469 
Agriculture 0.368 0.374 0.441 0.358 -1.343 -1.339 -1.25 -1.186 
Business consulting -0.157 -0.23 -0.227 -0.256 -1.985† -1.975† -1.986† -1.856† 
Novelty 0.208** 0.208** 0.216** 0.207** 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.014 
Major loan funding 0.708† 0.703† 0.661 0.701† -0.611 -0.608 -0.464 -0.571 
University degree -0.810† -0.818* -0.837* -0.814* 0.356 0.356 0.367 0.294 
Prior start-ups 0.412 0.383 0.344 0.382 0.353 0.354 0.387 0.353 
Solo venture -0.372 -0.393 -0.444 -0.385 -0.349 -0.345 -0.277 -0.346 
Loyalty - Full time work 1.185** 1.195** 2.176*** 1.194** 0.738* 0.737* -0.393 0.722† 
Loyalty - Initial dev. stage -0.039 -0.038 -0.036 -0.024 -0.005 -0.006 -0.01 -0.065 
Post- vs. pre-GFC   -0.357 0.58 0.052  0.042 -0.762 -1.563 
    (0.349) (0.616) (1.082)  (0.354) (0.489) (1.017) 
GFC x Full time work    -1.509    1.714*  
     (0.762)    (0.742)  
GFC x Development     -0.021    0.088* 
      (0.052)    (0.053) 
n 337    337    
Model Χ2 39.256** 40.294** 44.502*** 40.455** 26.104† 26.118† 31.778* 28.974† 
Log likelihood -123.603 -123.084 -120.980 -123.004 -126.684 -126.677 -123.847 -125.249 
Cox & Snell R2 0.110 0.113 0.124 0.113 0.075 0.075 0.090 0.082 
Nagelkerke R2 0.192 0.197 0.216 0.198 0.132 0.132 0.160 0.146 
ModelΔ Χ2  1.038 4.209* 0.161  0.014 5.660* 2.856† 
Note: Logistic regression parameters expressed as unstandardized coefficients, with standard error for variables with hypothesized influence in parentheses; † p < 
0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; one-tailed statistical significance for hypothesized directional effects and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table4: Summary of results of hypothesis tests 
Hypothesis tests Outcome 
 Exit  
H1:  GFC + Exit  Rejected 
 Voice  
H2a:  GFC + Voice as increased work effort  Rejected 
H2b: GFC + Voice as venture simplification by reduced Novelty Rejected 
H2c: GFC + Voice as venture simplification by reduced Growth ambition Rejected 
 Loyalty moderation  
H3: GFC x Loyalty as Full time work –  Exit Rejected 
GFC x Loyalty as Development stage –  Exit Supported 
H4a: GFC x Loyalty as Full time work  +  Voice as increased work effort Marginal support 
GFC x Loyalty as Development stage  +  Voice as increased work effort Rejected 
H4b: GFC x Loyalty as Full time work  +  Voice as reduced Novelty Rejected 
GFC x Loyalty as Development stage  +  Voice as reduced Novelty Rejected 
H4c: GFC x Loyalty as Full time work  +  Voice as reduced Growth ambition Supported 







Figure 1: GFC x Venture development interaction on exit – Stage of development interaction plot 















































Table A1: Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
  Variables N Min Max M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 All male venture 493 0 1 0.37 0.481                         
2 All female venture 493 0 1 0.28 0.45-0.48* 1                       
3 Age oldest 493 20 87 47.07 12.10-0.01 -0.05 1                     
4 Retail 493 0 1 0.17 0.38-0.13*  0.09* -0.15* 1                   
5 Consumer services 493 0 1 0.13 0.34 0.06  0.05 -0.02 -0.18* 1                 
6 Health and social 493 0 1 0.13 0.34-0.07  0.21*  0.03 -0.18* -0.15* 1               
7 Manufacturing 493 0 1 0.09 0.29 0.14* -0.12*  0.11* -0.14* -0.12* -0.12* 1             
8 Construction 493 0 1 0.06 0.23 0.03 -0.15* -0.07 -0.11* -0.09* -0.10* -0.08 1           
9 Agriculture 493 0 1 0.06 0.24 0.00 -0.08  0.14* -0.11* -0.10* -0.10* -0.08 -0.06 1         
10 Business cons. 493 0 1 0.10 0.29-0.02  0.09 -0.02 -0.15* -0.13* -0.13* -0.10* -0.08 -0.08 1       
11 Novelty 493 0 12 3.85 2.46 0.04 -0.02 -0.11* -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.01 -0.07 -0.05 1     
12 Major loan 493 0 1 0.20 0.40-0.04 -0.07  0.00 -0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.05  0.03  0.11* -0.09* -0.08 1   
13 Uni. degree 493 0 1 0.36 0.48-0.02 -0.22*  0.13* -0.03 -0.09  0.01  0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 1 
14 Prior start-ups 493 0 1 0.59 0.49 0.04 -0.20*  0.28*  0.02 -0.12* -0.05  0.07  0.03  0.12* -0.05  0.08  0.04  0.12* 
15 Solo venture 493 0 1 0.50 0.50 0.28*  0.47* -0.10* -0.03  0.13*  0.10*  0.03 -0.16* -0.10*  0.08 -0.04 -0.11* -0.40* 
16 Loyalty - Full time 493 0 1 0.37 0.48 0.07 -0.13*  0.02 -0.01  0.00  0.04 -0.05  0.05  0.08 -0.02  0.12*  0.21* -0.01 
17 Loyalty - Dev. stage 493 3 37 17.78 6.79 0.02 -0.10*  0.04 -0.05  0.00  0.05 -0.08  0.01  0.09  0.06  0.12*  0.30*  0.04 
18 Post- vs. pre-GFC 493 0 1 0.63 0.48-0.01 -0.04 -0.12* -0.02 -0.02 -0.05  0.06  0.06 -0.01 -0.08  0.04  0.03 -0.01 
19 Exit 493 0 1 0.33 0.47-0.01 -0.03 -0.08  0.07 -0.03 -0.07  0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07  0.06 
20 Voice - Inc. work 330 0 685 10.74 41.20-0.06 -0.06  0.12* -0.01 -0.02  0.03 -0.05 -0.04  0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.00  0.07 
21 Voice – Dec. novelty 337 0 1 0.15 0.36 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.00  0.03  0.06 -0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.06  0.19*  0.11 -0.12* 
22 Voice - Dec. growth 337 0 1 0.15 0.35 0.08  0.00 -0.06 -0.04  0.01  0.11* 0.00  0.05 -0.08 -0.11  0.06 -0.06  0.05 
 
  Variables 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
15 Solo venture -0.24* 1       
16 Loyalty - Full time  0.10* -0.07 1      
17 Loyalty - Dev. stage  0.15* -0.11*  0.48* 1         
18 Post- vs. pre-GFC -0.05 -0.07  0.05  0.00 1       
19 Exit  0.04 -0.08 -0.21* -0.27* -0.07 1     
20 Voice - Inc. work  0.07 -0.12*  0.03 -0.01  0.01 -0.02 1   
21 Voice – Dec. novelty  0.04  0.00  0.20*  0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 1 
22 Voice - Dec. growth  0.03  0.00  0.10  0.01  0.03 -0.04  0.11*  0.11* 
Note: * p < 0.05; all statistical significance are two-tailed  
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Table A2: Natural experiment statistics and Difference-in-Differences analysis of GFC effects on all dependent variables. 
Dependent 
variables 























Team size 1.928 2.010 0.081 1.144 1.513 0.369 0.288 0.018 0.288 0.166 
n=986 [0.181] [0.138] [0.228] [0.181] [0.138] [0.228] [0.322] (0.186) [0.299] (0.168) 
Work effort 29.455 40.728 11.273 30.271 37.780 7.509 -3.764 0.009 -3.893 0.102 
n=666 [4.414] [3.327] [5.527] [4.469] [3.319] [5.567] [7.844] (0.316) [7.549] (0.303) 
Novelty 3.736 3.968 0.232 3.208 3.329 0.120 -0.112 0.016 -0.113 0.075 
n=667 [0.227] [0.170] [0.283] [0.228] [0.172] [0.285] [0.402] (0.391) [0.394] (0.388) 
Growth 49.574 26.272 -23.302 3.769 35.310 31.541 54.843 0.002 45.523 0.047 
n=563 [24.452] [18.270] [30.523] [41.988] [18.404] [45.845] [55.076] (0.160) [55.079] (0.205) 
Others’ 5y survival 36.500 39.498 2.998  38.378 36.209 -2.169  -5.167 0.005† -4.877 0.081† 
probability    n=655 [1.904] [1.423] [2.377]  [1.912] [1.472] [2.413]  [3.387] (0.064) [3.291] (0.070) 
Note: Mean values for dependent variables are reported by experimental group and sampling wave, with standard errors in brackets []; Baseline sample 
corresponds with CAUSEE wave one (W1), follow-up sample corresponds with CAUSEE wave two (W2). Reported number of cases is double the number of 
ventures because two waves of data are used. Natural experimental group is defined by wave two interview timing post-GFC (Treatment group) versus pre-
GFC (Control group). “Diff.” reports differences in means within wave; Difference in differences reports average treatment effect for a model with the 
dependent variable only, as well as for a model which includes covariates (as in regression analyses); R2 reports explained variance, with one-tailed statistical 
significance in parentheses (p); † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
